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I do not appetir before you today as c.n expert on Soviet affairs 
Rather I am here c.s one who has lived and worked in Sou^h Asia for 
twenty years studying that region's security and foreign policy, 
which necessarily includes some amount of Kremlin-watching
In 1963 there was virtually no important regional support for tne 
Soviet Union except for the pro-Soviet wing of the Communist Party of 
Indie, and a few "friends" m  the Congress Party The Communist Party 
of Pakistan was outlawed, and m  any case had but a small following 
Russian influence in Afghanistan was competitive but marginal, and was 
insignificant in Nepal and Ceylon The Soviets were still agonizing 
over the fulfillment of a major arms deal with India— the licensed 
manufacture of the MiG-21 interceptor— but Indian defense planners had 
already turned to the West to rebuild their obsolete forces cf^er the 
Sino-Indian war of 1962 Indeed, American and Commonwealth air forces 
had just participated in a joint exercise with their Indian Air Force 
counterparts India adopted some of the McNamara innovations m  
defense planning and several hundred U S military personnel were in 
India to advise and consult There remained a large U S civilian and 
military presence in Pakistan, which at that time liked to term itself 
the "most allied" of American allies, participating in CENTO, SEATO 
and bi-lateral pacts with the U S
By 1983 the Soviets are firmly and probably permanently 
entrenched m  a devastated Afghanistan They have cordial relations 
with Pakistan even as they accuse it of aiding "insurgents" in 
Afghanistan, their symbolic economic projects, especially the Karachi 
steel mill, are on target Their presence m  Nepal, Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh is minimal, but that certainly is not the case in India
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which has become closely linked to the Soviet economy and defense 
establishment through massive purchases of weapons often bartered for 
Indian-made consumer goods Ironically, some of these goods are 
manufactured m  plants established by Western multinationals who seek 
back-door entry into the Soviet Union The Indian Air Force is 
virtually a display-CoSe of recent Soviet technology the Navy is more 
than half Soviet or Polish in origin, and the Army is newly dependent 
upon the Soviet Union for armor All of this, one might add, program 
of military "self-reliance" begun by Krishna Menon and Nehru 
twenty-five years ago
Does the above picture m  1933 represent a steady expansion of 
Soviet influence m  South Asia between 1963 snd 1983° No, does 
not, with the exception of Afghanistan— on the way to becoming a 
Soviet Central Asian republic in all but name Soviet influence was 
greater in 1966-71, when the U S had politically withdrawn from the 
region The Russians presided over the Tashkent meeting, which 
formally ended the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, they then provided some 
military assistance to Pakistan, and in 1971. after the Indo-Soviet 
Treaty of Peace and Friendship, they greatly increased their weapons 
supplies to India They also proposed a regional security treaty 
(that would have tied together a number of important Asian states) 
which was given serious consideration m  at least New Delhi However, 
the Soviets failed m  their broader strategic objective of uniting the 
two major South Asian states into a de facto alliance that might 
better serve Soviet interests
The present situation is not a case of more or less Soviet
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influence than in I963 or 1970, it is a different kind of influence 
more brutal more direct, far more expensive, but remaining fixed upon 
the same purpose 
Soviet Regional Interests
The interests of most states generally fall into one of two 
categories direct and indirect Direct interests involve relations 
with regions or other countries which are themselves important 
Indirect interests involve third parties State A is interested in
State B because of B's relationship to C Change the B-C relationship
(or the A-C relationship), and A-B ties vanish, at least as far as A 
is concerned
Soviet interests m  South Asia are almost c.11 indirect and 
strategic in purpose The exception is the current involvement m  
Afghanistan, although some of the events that led to it may have also 
been more relevant to Soviet policy elsewhere than to Afghanistan or 
even South Asia As for India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri 
Lanka, the Soviet connection is based on indirect strategic, not 
ideological or cultural or economic considerations In India, where 
the Soviets move most freely and arc most enthusiastically received, 
there is little personal warmth or ideological fervor behind the 
relationship To the Soviets India remains a bourgeoisie society at 
the top and a pre-revolutionary nightmare at the bottom, Indira Gandhi 
cracks down on the Indian Communists when it suits her domestic 
needs
Soviet interests in South Asie certainly are not economic 
Although the Indian trade and barter arrangement is convenient the
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Soviets are under no compulsion to export their weapons nor are they 
dependent upon any raw materials or finished products from South Asia 
The Soviets see no military threat to themselves from South Asia, nor 
do any South Asian countries belong to an alliance directed against 
them The Soviets, after all, were able to live in harmony with a 
Shah of Iran who was heavily dependent upon American weapons, and 
earlier normalized their relations with Pakistan when after 1965 Ayub 
Khan made it clear to them that Pakistan was not in CENTO or SEATO out 
of anti-Soviet reasons In any case, there has been virtually no 
serious American military presence m  South Asia for many years, as we 
have spent our energies and treasure elsewhere, yet it was this very 
period, that saw the greatest expansion of Soviet military and 
economic aid to the area
Finally, some see the Soviet connection to India as important 
because of the latter's role m  the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) This 
fails to take into account the inverse relationship between this role 
and Soviet interests in India It is undoubtedly useful to the 
Soviets to have a friendly state once again assume importance in the 
NAM, but India is neither a showcase of Soviet technology nor a 
trustworthy flunky, Cubans and others have been available for several 
years to express the authentic Soviet view in this forum
Soviet interests m  South Asia are primarily strategic m  nature 
and derive from the long-standing Sino-Soviet hostility They are 
thus indirect, and fluctuate with the Sino—Soviet relationship and 
with that between individual South Asian countries and the Chinese 
Nothing brings Soviet generals offering hardware to India quicker or
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intensifies the invective over Radio Peace and Progress more than the 
prospect of Sino-Indian negotiations over their border dispute 
Similarly, nothing troubles the Soviets more about Pakistan than that 
country’s continuing ties to China, even the new American connection 
is insignificant in comparison This was also true in the 19o0s 
American intelligence flights from Pakistan and Turkey did not 
directly threaten tne Soviet Union, and such ’’national means of 
verification" have since become legitimized in various SALT treaties 
Far more troubling to the Russians is the sight of another major 
communist power exercising an independent diplomacy indeed one aimed 
at easing pressure on China itself by strengthening other states with 
a common strategic interest Particularly galling is the direct road 
link between Cnma and Pakistan, which allows direct passage between 
Sinkiang and Pakistan, and traverses the Karakorams only a few miles 
away from Afghanistan's Wakhan corridor, this desolate area is the 
meeting place of four historic empires (the British Indian, the 
Persian, the Russian and the Chinese) The Soviets must regard it as 
having great symbolic value, for they occupied it immediately upon 
their invasion of Afghanistan
Compared with their sensitivity to China, the growing Soviet 
interest m  the Indian Ocean— or even in the revival of an American 
regional role— is secondary The Soviet Union is a land-based 
imperial state, excessively fearful of diversity on its borders 
China represents one kind of challenge to Soviet regional domination, 
the fall of a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan represented another 
both have implications for the permanence of Soviet control over
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Eastern Europe
While I believe that the most important reason behind Soviet 
interest in South Asia derives from their military, ideological, and 
strategic concerns vis a vis China, the pursuit of such an interest 
necessarily produces side effects Over a long period of time civil 
and military bureaucracies acquire a stake m  the maintenance of the 
relationship, and changing it can be difficult m  the face of 
institutional inertia But the Soviets have shown themselves to be 
adept at switching sides when opportunities arise and "objective 
conditions” alter The present structure of Soviet commitment and 
interest in South Asia is vulnerable in three ways
First, if Smo-Soviet relations improved neither would have as 
great an incentive to support what they believe to be their regional 
surrogates, Pakistan and India I do not regard this as very likely 
Somewhat more probable are two other developments One involves 
Soviet interests in Iran and the Persian Gulf and the possibility of a 
major Soviet role there Should the Gulf's politics become unstable, 
some Russians might argue that a warmer relationship with Pakistan 
might pay considerable dividends, even at the cost of trained 
relations with India For the Soviets the calculation would be the 
relative value of India vis a vis China versus the relative value of 
Pakistan vis a vis the Gulf and Afghanistan, this might also detach 
Pakistan from Chinese and American influence I do not see the 
present Pakistani leadership subscribing to such a view but there are 
those within the military and in some political parties who have 
argued for a much closer tie to the Soviets From Pakistan's
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perspective this would also raise the prospect of militarily 
de-linking India from the Soviet Union India would thus be faced 
with a genuine strategic dilemma It is simply less useful than 
Pakistan m  any grouping aimed at the Soviet Union Yet the Chinese 
would have little incentive to normalize their relationship with 
India, except perhaps to embarrass the Soviets (the India-China and 
Soviet-China border disputes being very similar in origin)
The third alternative to the present structure of Soviet 
influence in south Asia would be an increase m  regional cooperation 
free from Soviet control There are signs that Pakistan and India 
agree on one thing at least the Soviet presence m  Afghanistan is a 
threat to the region, not just Pakistan Were India to conclude that 
closer ties to Pakistan lessened its need for Soviet arms and that its 
own power was more than sufficient to enable it to negotiate on an
equal basis with China, it might ”do 
emerge as a powerful regional leader 
To summarize, Soviet interests i
a deal” with both antagonists and
indirect, and derive from its more irrportant conflict with the 
People's Republic of China India is one of the few countries with a 
live border with China, and could be vitally important to the Soviets 
in the eventuality of a war with China There is no evidence that the
n South Asia are largely
Indians have agreed to such a role (and the Soviets must be nervous 
that in such a crisis the Indians would not deliver), but only India 
and Vietnam have the capacity and interest to assist the Soviets in 
balancing Chinese power Pakistan, a close ally of China, has been
important m  a negative sense the Soviets wer as eager to undercut
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Chinese influence in the 70s and 80s as they were once eager to 
undercut American influence however, the prospect of an extended 
occupation in Afghanistan and Pakistan's good ties to the Islamic 
world are relatively new factors that have nothing to do with China 
and suggest a quite different line of policy 
The Soviets in Afghanistan
I find it difficult to be optimistic about negotiating the Soviet 
withdrawal from Afghanistan The Soviets have stated on more than one 
occasion that Afghanistan must not only continue to pursue a foreign 
policy compatible with Soviet interests, but that the revolution of 
1978 must not be aborted They have been willing to pay a very high 
price for their Afghan war not because they see Afghanistan as a route 
to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean (or even the Persian Gulf) but 
because Afghanistan now falls into that category of allied border 
state which includes Mongolia and Eastern Europe Force had to be 
used to save a pro-Soviet group in Afghanistan because it could not be 
as easily used in Poland, the Soviets wanted to show the world (and 
especially those who might challenge them in the WTO countries) that 
if pushed too far they could still act They will not 'trade" 
Afghanistan for Nicaragua or Cuba, but they will agree to talk, talk, 
talk, as long as they can continue to build an infrastructure of
loy^l if not happy— Afghans This is going to take a long time and
the Soviets would be most pleased if the U S were to offer guarantees 
that might ease the process of Sovietization Pakistani and Iranian 
support for the Mujahiddin is troublesome but the Soviets have the 
option of forcing even more refugees across the borders further
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destabilizing these two countries (Modern technology and terror 
tactics has made the term "decimation" obsolete, as over a quarter of 
the Afghan people are now either dead or in forced exile )
While this process goes on, the Soviets will take whatever 
benefits they can from Afghanistan Natural gas and mineral resources 
are promising and may yet pay for some of the cost of occupation, so 
is the use of Afghan territory for military forces which are oriented 
towards the Gulf and the Indian Ocean These, however, are the 
perquisites of imperial expansion, not its cause 
American Policy
Finally, what is America's role in the region'* Until 1964-5 the 
U S saw South Asia very much as the Soviets saw it an arena of 
conflict with other global rivals For the U S these rivals were 
China and the Soviet Union After 1965 several things nappened both 
the Soviet and the Chinese threat were sharply downgraded, 
Indo-Pakistan conflict (especially the 1965 war) led to 
disillusionment about the prospect of a coordinated regional 
anti-communist policy, concerns about internal subversion in these and 
other South Asian states faded, and, above all, Vietnam became a 
national obsession, necessitating a reduction of commitment elsewhere 
When the region momentarily emerged as important m  1971 it was purely 
as a function of the new Chinese connection, only when the Indians 
detonated a nuclear explosion in 1974 (and Pakistan began its own 
nuclear program) did the region command renewed official American 
interest (and, that was largely because of the fear thet nuclear 
weapons would spread to the Middle East) Oddly, while American
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policy has been steered by these indirect strategic considerations, 
there has been a substantial increase m  direct trade, cultural, 
educat lonal, and family ties between the U S and the major states of 
South Asia The personal basis for better relations between the U S , 
India and Pakistan was laid down during the same period that political 
ties to the region deteriorated
I think the time has come for a major reassessment of American 
policy in South Asia This reassessment must recognize three points
_ First the Soviets are likely to stay in Afghanistan
indefinitely They will not be forced out by Mujahiddm 
action, bu* neither should the U S assist them in their 
brutti pacification It is important to lend support and 
encouragement to the Mujahiddm should that time come when the 
Soviets undergo a change of mind and as a reminder to others 
that we are willing to support alternatives to 
totalitarianism, left or right
—  Second, South Asia itself has changed dramatically from the 
days when the U S tried to manage the regional balance of 
power India and Pakistan are truly non-aligned in that they
seek to keep both superpowers out of the region Further, 
India especially has emerged as a regional great power with a 
full-fledged missile and nuclear capability around the corner, 
Pakistan, although militarily inferior to its giant neighbors, 
is m  many ways the most powerful and developed country in the 
Islamic world Eoth states have shown renewed interest in 
working together in the context of a new South Asian regional
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association, it is very much in America’s interest to support 
and encourage such regionalism
—  Third, America’s fluctuating relationship with China is viewed 
in the region as a matter of utmost importance Close 
U S -PRC ties are misread in Delhi as implying a 
U S -PRC-Pakistan alliance directed against India The 
Soviets eagerly spread this line through their captive media 
sources They recognize that China is not a superpower (or 
even half a superpower), and correctly assess India’s 
strategic potential, an American China policy that fails to do 
so serves neither our interests in China or in South Asia 
The above suggests a long-term, albeit limited, strategic 
relationship with the major South Asian states, supporting them in 
their adjustment to the new Soviet presence and recognizing their 
resurgence as thoroughly independent states with interests that may 
not always harmonize with ours Such a policy has as a major asset 
the natural attraction of Amencn technology, culture, and society to 
the elites of these states They are repelled by the Soviets, but 
will they be offered a choice m  the matter9
